Environmental Case Law Index

Criminal law – defences – ignorance or mistake of law – acting in accordance with advice given by official whom the appellant had reason to believe was charged with administration of the law– mistake or ignorance of the law a defence when directly brought about by such advice

This was a criminal trial in which the accused was charged with two counts for contravening the Mines and Minerals Act and the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act.

The court determined whether the accused misrepresented that he had the mandate to sell a special grant which prejudiced the buyers. In finding the accused guilty of fraud, the court pointed out that the accused mispresented that he had the authority to deal with a coal mining concession held under a  special grant. Through the misrepresentation, the accused personally benefitted from the proceeds. The court further pointed out that the moment the accused benefitted from the criminal activity, the property became proceeds of crime. The accused further received occupation of the immovable property which he was not entitled.

On the criminal charge against the accused for ceding a mining right to a third person without the consent of the president, the court held that the section does not create a criminal offence. It merely sets out the characteristics of the special right and how it can be assigned.

The accused was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, with 2 years suspended for 5 years. Further 4 years were suspended on condition that the accused paid restitution to the complainant. Effectively, the accused was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. 

This was an application for a decree of perpetual silence against the respondents for engaging in lawsuits aimed at harassing the applicants. The dispute between the parties emanated from certain claims in a mine, which resulted in over 30 court applications between the parties.

The court first dealt with the nature of the relief sought by the applicants. The court after citing authorities pointed out that the relief is recognised in the jurisdiction of the court. The court pointed out that in cases where repeated and persistent litigation between parties, in the the same cause of action, the court can make a general order prohibiting the institution of such litigation without the leave of the court. It was noted that such a remedy is extraordinary as it makes a person deaf before the court. The court also pointed out that the remedy is only granted where a party demonstrates to the court that the defendant or respondent is a serial litigator, with a tendency to abuse the court, the court process and the other party.

In dismissing the application, the court dealt with the history of the litigants and concluded that the respondents had a defined cause and were not serial litigators. 

The court dismissed the application with costs on a higher scale.

In this High Court case, the applicant sought interim and final orders to the effect that the first respondent be stopped from carrying out mining activities on the disputed area. 

The applicant was a registered holder of Legion Mine in Gwanda (“mine”).  The respondents then entered into a three years’ tribute agreement with the first respondent. Terms of the agreement required the first respondent to pay royalties to the applicant.  However, after the three years expired, the first respondent refused to sign the new contract and to pay royalties to the applicant.

The issue for determination was whether the final order and an interim injunction could be issued against the first respondent, as sought by the applicant.

The respondent argued (1) that the damages suffered were reparable, and thus, a stop order could not be issued; (2) the affidavit was defective for failing (a) to indicate that the matter was urgent and (b) to make a distinction between payers that needed a final order and interim order. In response, the court held that (1) an interdict could be issued if the damages suffered are difficult to assess; (2) failure to title an affidavit as urgent does not make it defective if that could be read from the content of the affidavit; and (3)  the applicant's affidavit was clear that she wanted an interim injunction stopping the first respondent from carrying out mining operations and the final orders for a complete cessation of mining activities. 

Accordingly, the Court ordered the applicants prayers as sought. 

The plaintiff issued summons claiming damages for malicious arrest, detention and prosecution due to the first defendant’s conduct during his employment with the second respondent. The second defendant owned a mine and employed the first defendant as a security manager. The plaintiff alleged that the first defendant laid false charges to the effect that the plaintiff had stolen gold slime from the mine, which resulted in his arrest, detention and prosecution for theft of the gold slime. The defendants averred that the first defendant discovered that 75 000 tonnes of gold slime had been stolen from the mine and he made a report to the police. After making investigations it was established that the plaintiff had instructed two of the employees of the second defendant to collect gold slime from the second defendant’s mine, which resulted in the plaintiff being arrested. At the pre-trial conference it was agreed that the issues were whether the defendants maliciously and wrongfully caused the arrest of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.

Held: (1) it is an actionable wrong to procure the imprisonment or arrest of anyone by setting the law in motion against him maliciously and without reasonable cause.

(2) For the plaintiff to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution he must prove that the prosecution was instigated by the defendants and that it was concluded in favour of the plaintiff and that there was no reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution and that the prosecution was actioned by malice. For malice to be present, the defendant must thus not only have been aware of what he was doing in instituting or initiating the prosecution but must at least have foreseen the possibility that he was acting wrongfully, but nevertheless continued to act, reckless as to the consequences of his conduct (doluseventualis). Negligence on the part of the defendant (or even gross negligence) will not suffice.

(3) The plaintiff failed to prove that his arrest, detention and prosecution were malicious and so the claim would be dismissed with costs.

The court considered an appeal against the decision of the court below. The appellant was found in possession of gold and arrested because he failed to produce a licence. He was charged with contravening s3 of the Gold Trade Act and convicted following his plea of guilty. He was sentenced to the mandatory five years imprisonment. 

The appellant filed a late appeal against his sentence, which the court condoned. In the notice of appeal, the appellant introduced grounds of appeal against the conviction. Thus, the court first had to consider whether the appellants appeal against the conviction was admissible and had merit.

Given that the appellant only filed an appeal against his sentence and not his conviction, and that only the lateness of that appeal was condoned, the court found that the appeal against the conviction was filed out of time and had no merit. 

The court then considered the appeal against the sentence. The appellant argued that he did not know he had to have a permit to carry the gold in Zimbabwe, and that he operated under a bona fide mistake of law, that amounted to a special circumstance. The court found that the appellant would not have expected Zimbabwe to have regulations on the possession of gold and his failure to declare the gold upon entry into Zimbabwe reflected his mala fides.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 

The court considered an urgent application, which was heard in chambers, to prevent the applicants’ eviction from their mining claims. 

The mining claims, which were abandoned, were owned by the second respondent. Pursuant to the abandonment, the mining claims were opened up to prospecting third parties. 

The applicants claimed that they applied to the relevant authority and were granted a lease of the disputed mining claims. Consequently, they argued that they should not be evicted.

The court, therefore, had to determine whether the eviction of the applicants was lawful.

The court found that the applicants failed to provide evidence showing that they had obtained a lease. It also found that the second respondent, which purportedly abandoned the mining claims in dispute, had been placed under a reconstruction order in terms of the Reconstruction of State-Indebted Insolvent Companies Act [CAP 24:27], which had the effect of voiding every disposition of the property, without the approval of the administrator. In this instance, the administrator did not approve the abandonment. As such, it was null and void, and was not open for prospecting.

The court found that the applicants’ manager and principal officer in person, not the applicants themselves, featured in the provided documents and that the eviction was against that person. The applicants themselves never acquired a right over the mining claims.
Finally, the court found the applicants were sluggard and failed to approach the court in good time.

Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

This was an application for an interdict to prohibit mining activities at West Nicholson mine and a further order relating to the processing, sale of and distribution of gold ore mined by the applicants. 

The applicants were members of the West Nicholson Youth in Mining Association. The 2nd respondent offered to grant a tribute to the association to mine gold ore and three representatives were appointed by the association to negotiate with the 2nd respondent. After operations had begun, the three representatives along with the 3rd respondent, a third party, unilaterally implemented a profit sharing scheme which gave 50 percent of the proceeds to the four of them. 

The 3rd respondent opposed the application contending that it did not satisfy the requirements of an interdict because the applicants had no prima facie right.

The main issue for the court’s consideration was whether or not the applicants had satisfied the requirements of an interdict. The court found that the applicants had proved that they were members of the association and had therefore established a prima facie right to the mining benefits granted by the agreement. The court further held that there was a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm to the applicants if the interim relief was not granted and that this had been clearly proved by the applicants. 

Accordingly, the court granted the interim interdict as prayed.

The court considered an application to set aside the National Water Authority Regulations and tariffs on the ground that they were ultra vires and violated the applicants’ rights. 

The applicants’ business operations involved sugar-cane growing and sugar processing. They concluded two agreements with the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA), which related to the supply of water. It was a term of the agreement that the parties would, together, review charges for raw water, and should they fail to agree, the respondent would fix the prices.  Subsequently, ZINWA addressed a letter advising the applicants of their intention to review the charges. The respondent unilaterally increased the tariffs and failed to notify the applicants. The respondent argued that in terms of the ZINWA Act, she had the authority to impose tariffs for water charges and that the regulations did not violate the applicants’ rights. 

The court considered whether the respondent had acted lawfully in imposing the water tariffs. It found that the government reviewed the water charges, and not ZINWA which was lawfully established to review the tariffs in as far as the applicant was concerned.  

The court found that the respondent could not unilaterally increase water tariffs, unless ZINWA had made application to it to justify the increase. In this case, the respondent failed to notify the applicants, nor did she give them an opportunity to respond. The court concluded that the respondent acted ultra vires by increasing the tariffs and her actions were unlawful. Accordingly, the application was upheld

The applicant, had received a letter from the Secretary for Mines and Mining Development alerting them that their special grants for mining had expired and they had to cease all mining activities and vacate the covered mining areas. The Minister further issued a press statement on the consolidation of all diamond mining activities in the grant areas.

The applicant averred that the above decisions had prejudicial effect on it which also violated its property rights.

The respondents alluded that the application was improperly brought before the court as it appeared to be a response to the judgment of the High Court which the applicant had previously lodged but never appealed and that the cause of action was res judicata and that the avoidance principle applied here. The court, therefore, had to decide on these three main points.

The court held that the appeal had been disguised as a case concerning constitutional points and should have been brought in terms of s167(5)(b) of the Constitution.

It held that although the basis of the application had changed with the introduction of the constitutional question, the effect of the relief sought remained the same.

The court also held that the bulk of the applicant’s case was on right to just administrative action which was protected under the Administrative Justice Act which had sufficient grounds to deal with the rights they alleged had been infringed.

The matter was dismissed with costs.