The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The applicants sought to interdict the respondents from applying the provisions of the Medicines and Related Substances Act (Medicines Act) and prevent them from seizing and detaining Playboy e-cigarettes and hookahs pending the outcome of part B of the application. A consignment of e-cigarettes belonging to the first applicant was seized by the first respondent. Part B of the application was a review of the decision by the respondents to amend Schedules 1, 2, and 3 of the Medicines Act.
The two issues in dispute were that the Medicines Act was being selectively enforced against the applicant as there had been no measures or steps taken in the past against other importers, distributors or retailers of e-cigarettes. Secondly, that the seizure of the consignment was not in accordance with the Medicines Act.
The respondents contended that selective enforcement took place due to capacity constraints. Whether or not the selective enforcement was constitutional depended upon whether there was a rational basis therefor. The court held that the selection was irrational and targeted the applicant for no objective reason. The means by which the respondent went about enforcing the Medicines Act against the applicant and no other retailer, distributor or importer was not connected to the governmental purpose of regulating e-cigarettes containing nicotine. The seizure of the consignment was set aside in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. The court held that there was no need to make a determination on the interpretation of the Medicines Act.
The application was granted with costs.
The matter involves a merger approval application for an already implemented merger between Media24 and Novus following concerns raised by Caxton and a consequent divestiture.
The Competition Tribunal first considered whether the merger had raised any competition concerns. It dealt with two concerns; information exchange and input foreclosure. In assessing the information exchange concern, the tribunal accepted the parties’ assertion that appointing non-operational persons to the Novus board would minimise the risk of information sharing.
Concerning the possibility of competitor foreclosure, the tribunal accepted that the lack of Novus’ competitors to absorb the foreclosed capacity gives more incentive for foreclosure. However, it reasoned that this incentive is countered by the divestiture which reduces media24’s control, both de jure and de facto, over Novus. Further, it noted that the other publications handled by Novus are not in competition with Media24 thus it would not need to foreclose.
The tribunal also considered if the merger raised public interest concerns, mainly whether the merger would negatively affect smaller businesses. It was stated that noting that there is reduced possibility of market foreclosure - conduct which would negatively impact these businesses, these concerns fell away. Moreover, it was noted that the merger would in fact positively impact B-BBEE shareholders of Media24 hence it positively served public interests.
The Tribunal therefore concluded that considering the divestiture and the absence of negative competition and public interests impacts, the merger transaction has to be approved.
This was an application to compel the Competition Commission of South Africa to produce a record of investigation.
The issue emanated from an investigation by the respondent on banks on allegation of collusive conduct in regard to trade in foreign currency. The applicant was one of the banks investigated. The applicant requested without success on several times for the record of investigation from the respondent. It then made an application to compel the respondent to provide the record.
The respondent opposed the application arguing that the applicant should have proceeded by way of review under Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) because its action amounted to an administrative act. The applicant on the other hand argued that the commission’s conduct did not constitute administrative action and the tribunal should consider the application.
In deciding the matter, the Competition Tribunal held that the respondent action did not qualify as administrative action because it does not meet the requirement of finality. However, it found that the Competition Commission cannot be compelled to provide the requested record because of the complex nature of the process. It ruled that the respondent should provide the requested record during discovery.
The case concerned an appeal of the High Court’s judgment regarding ownership of a house and the relevance of legislation relating to public officers in so far as the case was concerned.
The court considered whether the case before the High Court was a land matter and whether legislation relating to public officers was applicable to the case.
The court held that the case was indeed a land matter and that legislation relating to public officers that bars claims against public officers was not applicable to the case.
The court examined legislation and previous judgments and concluded that the legislation relating to public officers that barred claims against public officers due to prescription was not applicable to the case in the High Court because it was a land matter. The court stated that issues relating to land recovery, breach of contract and claims for work done were some of the exceptions to the application of the statute that barred claims against public officers. The court stated that since the subject matter of the case before the High Court concerned a house, it meant that the matter related to the recovery or retention of land or property.
Consequently, the appeal succeeded, the ruling of the High Court set aside, and the matter was remitted to the High Court to be heard afresh.
The court considered whether the second respondent was a public officer as defined under s 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004 (the act) and whether the revocation of the certificate of occupancy can be said to be for an overriding public interest as defined in s 28 of the Land Use Act.
This case concerned an appeal of the judgment of the court below, declining jurisdiction, whereby the appellant claimed ownership of the land.
It was argued that a minister does not fall within the confines of the definition of ‘public officer’ as contended in the act.
The court found that the act applies not only to public officers but also to public officials who hold their respective offices for, or in trust of the public, thus, the minister is a public officer as contemplated in the act. Therefore, a public officer is a member of the public service.
On the second point, the court held that s 28 of the Land Use Act gives the minister the power to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public interest. Overriding public interest means the requirement of the land by the government of the state or by local government in the state, for public purpose within the state.
The court found that the revocation of the right of occupancy was valid and for overriding public interest.
The court considered whether the respondent’s witness' statement on oath needed to be amended notwithstanding the amendment of the statement of defence. Further, whether the appellant was properly retired from the service of the second respondent.
The court held that the giving of a written statement on oath is a distinct process from the statement of defence which serves to support the statement of defence but is not part of it. Further, according to the public service rules the compulsory retirement age for all grades in the service shall be sixty years or thirty-five years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. A statement of policy cannot overrule public service rules, especially where such terms are not written in terms of the contract of employment.
The court found that when the respondents were given leave to amend their statement of defence, the amended statement of defence took effect from the date of the original statement of defence. Therefore, it was too late for the appellant to object to the effect that there was no written deposition to support the amended statement of defence. The court also found that the premature retirement was unlawful, null and void thus entitled to reinstatement.
The court accordingly upheld the appeal and awarded costs.
The appeal stemmed from the denial of the appellant's right to defend on merits due to the lower court’s grant of an Order 14 summary judgement in favor of the respondent, without properly engaging with the merits of the matter.
Substantively, the court held that in a summary judgement application the plaintiff must bring a prima facie case for the claim, which includes showing the basis of the claim, before the burden shifts to the defendant to defend. However, a complete defence is not required but rather the defendant only needs to show that he has a reasonable defence to the claim and his defence is not a sham or intended to delay payment.
Since the respondent’s claim had been based on an agreement and an alleged assignment, the court reasoned that on assessment of the evidence the argument of assignment lacked the element of intent and thus could not stand. Further, the argument that the respondent was a beneficiary of the agreement in question was unfounded. The trial court therefore erred in its decision to grant summary judgment as the very basis of the claim was reasonably challenged on the facts.
The court thus concluded that the appellant had been unjustifiably been shut out of trial. It thus allowed the appeal setting aside the summary judgement.
The case related to a petroleum agreement between the Ghanaian government and a Norwegian company. The agreement was ratified by Parliament, but the Minister of Energy thereafter refused the company’s assignment of their Petroleum Agreement to its wholly owned local subsidiary. The question was whether Parliament’s permission is required to terminate a resource exploitation transaction, as they ratify it. The rationale for ratification is for transparency, openness and participation in matters involving natural resources but the exercise of checks and balances does not extend to approving termination of agreements that the executive has jurisdiction over. The court held that whereas Parliament ratified these agreements, the act remains an act of the executive and Parliament’s approval is not needed to terminate the agreement.
The matter involved a dispute concerning the nature and validity of the transaction between the defendant, a government-owned limited liability company, and Karpower. The matter revolved around the interpretation given to the phrase ‘international transaction’ in article 181 of the Constitution, a phrase whose effect is that the transaction required parliamentary approval.
The first question that faced the court concerned jurisdiction. The court relied on ample case law to arrive at the position that the Supreme Court is not a clearing house to assume jurisdiction which otherwise belongs to other lower courts. It noted that jurisdiction would only be exercised where it is manifestly clear and obvious that the cases are deserving.
Substantively, the court then had to consider the legal nature of the defendants in order to ascertain whether they were the alter ego of the government. After scrutinising the relevant transactions, the court reasoned that it was clear that the defendants, as juristic persons, had the capacity to enter into the transactions they entered into with the relevant institutions without seeking parliamentary approval as stipulated in article 181 (5) of the Constitution.
The court concluded that given the established interpretation of ‘international transaction’ and the legal nature of the defendants, the nature of transaction between the first defendants and Karpowership does not constitute an international business transaction with a government. It therefore did not require compliance with article 181 (5) of the Constitution.
The court dismissed the application.